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Not Quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan’s Security, the 
US-Japan Alliance, and the ‘War on Terror’ in East Asia 
 
Abstract 
Japan in responding to US expectations for support in the ‘war on terror’ has displayed a degree of 
strategic convergence on global security objectives, thus prompting policy-makers and observers to dub 
it the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’. This article argues, however, that Japan is far from assuming this 
role. For Japan, the ‘war on terror’ serves more as a political pretext to legitimise long-planned for 
changes in military security policy that are often only marginally related to the US’s anti-terrorism 
agenda. Instead, Japan has focussed much more on using the terror threat rationale as a means to  push 
forward its response to the regional and traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, even 
if at times it attempts to depict both as ‘new security challenges’ or as involving elements of counter-
terrorism. The final conclusion is that US military hegemony may be weakened by Japan’s and the 
Asia-Pacific’s potential divergence from its global security agenda.  
 
Introduction: Japan on board the US anti-terrorism agenda? 
It is undeniable that the events of 11 September 2001, and the ensuing US-led military 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the ‘war on terror’, have provided the 
context for major changes in Japan’s post-war security culture and policy trajectory. 
Japan’s government—under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō until 
September 2006, and then from October 2006 under the premiership of Abe Shinzō—
has professed support for US objectives in expunging the threats of trans-national 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to face down 
‘rogue states’ and elements of the ‘axis of evil’, especially Iraq and North Korea. 
Japan has moreover demonstrated a strong degree of support for US methods in 
pursuing the ‘war on terror’ and for the wider political and military agenda of the 
presidency of George W. Bush. The Japanese government expressed ‘understanding 
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and support’ for both the US-led military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 
and 2003 (Shushō Kantei 2003), and thus seeming implicit approval for ‘preemptive 
war’ and ‘regime change’ in these states. Japan then further demonstrated its support 
for US military actions with the passing in the National Diet of the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law (ATSML) in October 2001 and the Iraqi Reconstruction Law 
(IRL) in July 2003. These laws have enabled the despatch of Japan Self Defence 
Forces (JSDF) units to the Indian Ocean (ongoing since 2001) and to southern Iraq 
(2004-2006) in ‘coalitions of the willing’ through the provision of non-combat 
logistical and reconstruction support.  
Japan has subsequently continued to follow a trajectory in its military security 
policy that in many ways matches US strategy in the ‘war on terror’, and in fact in 
many cases has been planned bilaterally with the US. Japan has committed itself from 
December 2003 to the procurement of an off-the-shelf Ballistic Missile Defence 
(BMD) system from the US; joined the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
from 2003; passed National Emergency Legislation in 2003 and 2004 to cope with 
military contingencies; released a revised National Defence Programme Guideline 
(NDPG) in 2004 that sets out its future defence priorities, including ‘force 
transformation’; and recently concluded in 2006 a Defence Policy Review Initiative 
(DPRI) with the US that has had as one of its objectives the upgrading of the 
functions and interoperability of the US-Japan alliance to deal not only with regional 
but now global contingencies—all of these measures drawing on the rationale of the 
need to respond to the threat of global trans-national terrorism.  
These developments, coming relatively thick and fast given the incremental pace 
of change in the post-war period, mark important changes in Japan’s security posture. 
Japan can be seen to be deviating from its traditional national security culture of 
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comprehensive security (sōgō anzen hoshō)—emphasising a cautious balance of 
military and non-military elements in security—and to be shifting towards a harder-
edged military stance, or as some would posit, more ‘normal’ stance in regional and 
global security (Soeya 2004; Hughes 2004a). Moreover, Japan’s strengthening 
position as the US’s key bilateral alliance partner in the Asia-Pacific, both as a 
purveyor of bases for power projection and increasingly active partner in responding 
to military contingencies, is set to bolster US regional and global strategy in the ‘war 
on terror’ and its military hegemony in general.  
Japan it thus seems, in the midst of the ‘war on terror’, is showing apparent signs 
of convergence with the ‘Bush Doctrine’. Policy-makers and commentators have now 
begun to speculate that Japan may indeed come to parallel the role of the ‘Great 
Britain of the Far East’ (Institute for National Strategic Studies 2000; Takahashi 2005; 
Tanter 2005, 162). Japan is increasingly depicted, whether in positive or negative 
light given the history of pre-war militarism, as a ‘go anywhere, do anything’ type of 
potential ally, which shares the US’s strategic world vision, in line with the UK’s 
perceived position since 11 September. Moreover, regardless of the actual reality of 
the degree of the UK’s devotion to the US strategic agenda post-11 September, the 
US-UK alliance has been deliberately help up by US and Japanese policy-makers as a 
model to be replicated for their own alliance’s future  (Institute for National Strategic 
Studies 2000).  
However, this article, whilst acknowledging (as argued elsewhere) the importance 
of the ‘war on terror’ in generating momentum for genuine change in Japan’s national 
security doctrines and the US-Japan alliance (Hughes 2004b, 2004c), has the 
objective of investigating more fully the degree and exact ways in which the need to 
respond to terrorism has impacted on Japan’s security policy. It argues that, based on 
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such an investigation, there are equally strong grounds for caution in ascribing Japan 
anything like the role of the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’, and that, despite the 
ongoing impact of the ‘war on terror’, there remain major restrictions on Japan’s 
military ambitions and role and how far it is prepared to support the US in its anti-
terrorism agenda. In this sense, Japan, although very much at the forefront of Asia-
Pacific allies in supporting the US in the ‘war on terror’ and growing ever closer in 
terms of security cooperation, still demonstrates a similar reticence to other regional 
states, including China and a number of ASEAN states, in regard to US objectives and 
means when it comes to the US imposition of its global agenda in combating 
terrorism on the regional security context (Dosch 2006: 71-111). Hence, Japan is still 
far away from achieving a status that matches either the reality or manipulated ideal 
of the US-UK alliance.  
This article argues that, although September 11 and the ‘war on terror’ have 
provided the trigger and occasion for increasingly radical changes in Japan’s security 
policy, at the same time the threat of terror per se only provides at best a partial 
rationale for these changes. In many instances, the ‘war on terror’ serves as a political 
pretext to legitimise long-planned for changes in military security policy that Japanese 
policy-makers reveal from their statements and actions to be often only marginally 
related to the US’s anti-terrorism agenda, or even totally unrelated. Instead, Japan’s 
during the ‘war on terror’ has been focussed much more on using 11 September, and 
the Afghan and Iraq wars as an opportunity to push forward its response to the 
regional and more traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, and 
energy security, even if at times it attempts to depict both as ‘new security challenges’ 
or as involving elements of terrorism.  
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In turn, Japan’s opportunism in exploiting the post-September 11 situation for its 
more particular security ends, and consequently its lack of a deeper and more pressing 
shared vision with the US of security centring around trans-national terrorism, also 
mean that this creates continued potential for divergence between the strategic 
cultures of Japan and its ally. As the article will argue, Japan’s greatest degree of 
divergence comes over the issues of how far it will extend its functional and 
geographical cooperation to combating terrorism and WMD, especially in the Middle 
East. Meanwhile, even though Japan may have a much closer degree of convergence 
in tackling WMD in the case of North Korea, there are still some grounds for bilateral 
dissent in this area. The overall conclusion to be drawn from this investigation is that, 
despite all the evidence of Japan clambering on board specific bilateral military 
programmes and in working to revamp the alliance’s functions, the US cannot count 
with confidence even upon Japan to assist it to execute its regional and global security 
agenda, and thus stands on some precarious ground in its pursuit of the ‘war on 
terror’.  
 
Japan’s strategic culture and the impact of the ‘war on terror’ 
Japan’s strategic culture and security policy throughout the post-war period have 
involved the pursuit of ‘comprehensive security’, consisting of both military and non-
military (economic and diplomatic) components. In terms of military security, Japan’s 
post-war policy-makers—consisting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 
Japan Defence Agency (JDA) (as of January 2007, Japan Defence Ministry of 
Defence) and the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—have largely entrusted 
this component to the US-Japan security treaty and alliance. Japan and the US 
predicate their security treaty upon a grand strategic bargain: Japan accepting US 
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military protection in return for its provision of bases to facilitate the projection of US 
military power in East Asia. Japan has attempted to temper its reliance on the US 
security guarantee, however, by the build-up of its own national defence capabilities 
and indigenous defence production, and by careful hedging against the dual alliance 
dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment in US regional and global military strategy 
(Hughes and Fukushima 2004).  
Japan has thus hedged against entrapment in US military ‘adventurism’ 
(Heginbotham and Samuels 2002) in a number of ways. It has predicated its entire 
security policy upon constitutional interpretations that allow the exercise of individual 
self-defence but prohibit the exercise of collective self-defence. Japan in line with this 
interpretation has no obligation to defend its US security treaty partner outside its own 
national territory. In addition, Japan’s concern about entrapment meant that it was 
highly cautious about any integration of JSDF capacities and missions with those of 
the US military. Japan’s military security role in the Cold War was geographically 
restricted to the area immediately surrounding Japan, and limited functionally to 
providing a defensive  ‘shield’ to assist the US offensive ‘sword’ in Northeast Asia 
(Hughes 2005a).  
In turn, Japan’s comprehensive security policy further sought to counterbalance 
reliance on military power and the US-Japan alliance by utilising economic power. 
Japanese policy-makers throughout the Cold War and beyond have viewed economic 
power and diplomatic engagement (often taking the form of the use of Official 
Development Assistance [ODA] and the promotion of economic interdependence) as 
effective tools for countering the rise of potential security threats. Japan has long 
viewed economic engagement with China as a means to promote its peaceful 
 7
reinsertion into the international system, and has even persevered, if inconsistently, 
with the economic engagement of North Korea (Hughes 2005b).  
Japan’s approach towards terrorism during the Cold War period and prior to 11 
September also corresponded very much with this comprehensive security agenda. 
Japan was prepared to use minimal force, although essentially civilian police rather 
than military force, to suppress its own domestic terrorism problems in the 1970s—
effectively pushing its radical groups such as the Nihon Sekigun offshore to the 
Middle East. Japan’s security authorities at the same time, though, recognised that 
terrorism was a multi-causal phenomenon borne from social discontent, and attempted 
to reintegrate radicals back into domestic society and to undercut their support base, 
rather than using policing force alone. Japan’s relatively small-scale domestic 
terrorism problem, its successful elimination of it, and its reluctance to be seen to use 
major force to overcome terrorism, meant that it often appeared detached from the 
international norms of dealing with terrorism (Leheny 2006,148-151).  
Japanese comprehensive security has begun to undergo significant alterations and 
challenges in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the impact of 11 September. 
Japan faced its first major global security crisis during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, 
when it was presented with and failed to respond to demands from its US ally and the 
international community to provide a ‘human contribution’ to the war effort in the 
form of JSDF despatch. Japan has also confronted heightened regional threats, and 
most immediately from North Korea. Japanese anxieties focus upon the North’s 
development of nuclear weapons and proliferation of WMD—most graphically 
demonstrated by the North’s announcement of a nuclear test on 10 October 2006. 
These fears are compounded by the North’s ballistic missile programme—Japan’s 
vulnerability to missile attack highlighted by the test launch over its airspace of a 
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Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998, and a series of North Korean missile tests in the 
Sea of Japan in July 2006. Japanese policy-makers since the first North Korean 
nuclear crisis of 1993-94 have also entertained fears of incursions into Japanese 
territory by North Korean spy ships (fushinsen) and North Korean guerrilla attacks.  
North Korea represents the most ‘immediate and present’ danger for Japan, and 
especially in the public consciousness, but China embodies the greatest challenge for 
Japan’s security over the medium to longer terms. Japan’s greatest concerns revolve 
around China’s increasing propensity to exercise military power outside its immediate 
borders. Japanese policy-makers fear a Chinese blue-water naval capacity that might 
interfere with Japan’s Sea Lines of Communication through the South China Sea, and 
Sino-Japanese tensions have been heightened by territorial disputes in the East China 
over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) and Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) gas fields. In addition, Japan-China security relations have been further 
complicated by the Taiwan issue and Sino-US strategic competition. Japan watched 
with anxiety the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996, and fears that China may look to 
eventually challenge the US militarily in the region over the longer term. Japan’s 
security planners envisage that in the event of a new Taiwan independence crisis 
reaching the point of conflict, US bases in Japan are likely to be the target of Chinese 
ballistic missile attack, China might attempt to use amphibious forces to seize 
offshore islands to disrupt US-Japan alliance cooperation, and that Japan risks 
becoming sucked into war with its neighbour through US alliance pressure.  
Japan’s preferred options in responding to these global and regional crises have 
clearly been non-military in nature. Japan has continued to rely on diplomatic 
approaches to the North Korean nuclear crisis: Prime Minister Koizumi initiating 
summits with the North in 2002 and 2004, designed to clear away the obstacles to 
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bilateral diplomatic normalisation and to demonstrate to the US the importance of 
persisting with negotiations in order to avoid conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 
Japanese policy-makers have further persisted with their efforts to engage North 
Korea economically even as high-level diplomatic relations stagnated during 
Koizumi’s premiershp (Tanaka and Tahara 2005, 27-29). Moreover, Japan has 
continued to place great emphasis on issues of economic insecurity and non-
traditional security concerns as important in their own right within comprehensive 
security. Japan has played an important part in articulating conceptions of ‘human 
security’ as can be seen in its reaction to the economic and social fallout from the East 
Asia financial crises of 1997-98 and its humanitarian relief activities in the Asian 
tsunami of 2004.  
Nonetheless, Japanese policy-makers have shown signs of declining confidence in 
their ability to use economic and diplomatic means to respond to security issues such 
as North Korea and China. These concerns have been prompted by Japan’s own 
relative economic decline vis-à-vis a rising China, and the need to reduce the overall 
ODA budget (although Japan has indicated from 2006 its desire to once again 
increase its overseas aid). Japanese policy-makers have thus sought since the mid-
1990s to rebalance comprehensive security by strengthening its military components. 
Japan in response to the global crisis of the Gulf War eventually found a form of 
military response through the passing in June 1992 of the International Peace 
Cooperation Law (IPCL) that allows JSDF on UN-mandated non-combat 
peacekeeping operations.  
However, the principal shifts in Japan’s military posture have come in response to 
regional security crises and through the augmentation of the functional and 
geographical parameters of the US-Japan alliance. The twin crises in the 1990s of the 
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North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan Straits crisis demonstrated the essential 
lack of preparedness and interoperability of the US-Japan alliance to respond to 
regional contingencies—Japan having no ready response to requests from its US ally 
to provide logistical support in the event of the outbreak of conflict, thereby revealing 
the essential emptiness of the fifty year old alliance. Japan and the US moved to 
remedy these alliance weaknesses with the implementation from 1997 onwards of the 
revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation. The revised Guidelines for the 
first time outlined the extent of logistical rear-area support that Japan could provide 
for its US ally in the event of a regional contingency; although they were notable also 
in stressing Japan’s ability to hedge against entrapment in US regional contingencies 
by stressing that its support was based on ‘situational need’ rather than strict 
geographical demarcations that might include Taiwan.  
Japan’s security policy can therefore be seen to have begun to move into a 
transitional phase since the mid-1990s, and this shift has been further boosted by 
threats of trans-national terrorism. Japan was the first state to experience a terrorist 
group’s use of WMD in the Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 
March 1995. The Japanese domestic security authorities again responded to the 
terrorist threat mainly through the use of policing powers and attempts to maintain 
close monitoring of the group’s followers whilst looking to achieve their reintegration 
back into general society. At the same time, though, the attacks heightened the 
awareness of the Japanese policy-makers concerning their state’s potential 
vulnerability to these new forms of maximalist terrorism, and the need to consider 
more military style counter-terrorism through the deployment of the JSDF (Hughes 
1998). Nevertheless, it has been the new global crisis of the ‘war on terror’ which has 
generated the greatest momentum for change in Japan’s security policy, even if it has 
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not necessarily presented the main rationale for the nature of changes actually 
undertaken.  
Japan’s policy-makers and the general public abhorred the 11 September attacks, 
and Prime Minister Koizumi moved with extraordinary speed to pass the ATSML and 
the IRL through the National Diet. In line with the ATSML, the JSDF has provided 
logistical support to the coalition in Afghanistan, especially refuelling coalition 
shipping in the Indian Ocean. The IRL has enabled the despatch of Ground Self 
Defence Force (GSDF) personnel to Samawah in Iraq to engage in reconstruction 
activities. Japan’s activities indicate a new stage in the expansion of its military 
responsibilities: marking the first time that the JSDF has been despatched overseas 
during on-going conflicts in the post-war period; and providing the JSDF with a new 
mandate to use its weapons if necessary to protect not only its own members but also 
the military personnel of the US and other states, and refugees. Japan has bought itself 
a relatively privileged position in the US ‘coalitions of the willing’, positioning JSDF 
personnel at US central command in Tampa, and learning the principles of 
multinational cooperation under US direction by working alongside the UK, 
Australia, the Netherlands, Thailand and other allies (Hughes 2005b).  
Japan’s cooperation with the US in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ‘war on terror’ 
have also fed back into a second cycle of the upgrading of the functions of the 
bilateral security treaty. This cycle follows on from the changes of the late 1990s by 
upgrading the functions of the bilateral security treaty for regional security, but now 
marks a new shift by emphasising the importance of global cooperation as well. Japan 
and the US initiated their DPRI in May 2006 in response to two sets of rationales. 
From the US perspective, the paramount objective—in line with the Global Posture 
Review (GPR) was to activate its regional bases and alliances to combat global threats 
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of terrorism and WMD proliferation, and most especially in the ‘arc of instability’ 
running from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. In the case of Japan, the US sought 
to relocate the US Army I Corps, a rapid deployment force covering the Asia-Pacific 
and the Middle East, from Washington State to Army Camp Zama in Kanagawa. The 
ramification of this was that Japan would serve as a frontline command post for US 
global power projection to as far away as the Middle East. From the Japanese 
perspective, although there was acceptance of the need to respond to the US’s new 
anti-terrorism agenda, the initial domestic political priority was to take the 
opportunity of the GPR to push for the realignment of US bases in order to reduce the 
burden on Japanese local communities of hosting US forces, especially in Okinawa. 
Japan and the US engaged in hard bargaining until the conclusion of the DPRI in May 
2006.  
Japan succeeded in securing the scaling down of US Marine forces in Okinawa, 
whilst the US and Japan also appeared to converge on the future global agenda of the 
US-Japan alliance. Japan accepted the hosting of the US Army I Corps, thus marking 
a de facto breaching of the interpretations of the scope of the US-Japan security treaty 
and US bases as covering only Japan and the Far East. Japan and the US also issued 
through their Security Consultative Committee (SCC) a joint statement in February 
2005 which stressed the common global strategic objectives of the alliance, including 
the eradication of terrorism and prevention of WMD proliferation (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005).  
Japan appears to have begun to back up these statements with specific military 
planning. In December 2005, the Japanese government released the revised NDPG, 
the document that sets out strategic doctrine alongside the necessary force 
capabilities, and also released a new Mid-Term Defence Programme (MTDP) which 
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sets out the key military assets that Japan seeks to acquire. The NDPG opens by 
stressing the need to gear the JSDF to respond to ‘new threats’, including WMD and 
ballistic missile proliferation and international terrorist activities, as well as regional 
threats such as attacks on Japan’s offshore islands, guerrilla incursions and full-scale 
invasion. Moreover, it focuses upon the need for Japan to consider the importance of 
the security of the area ‘spreading from the Middle East to East Asia’, thereby 
indicating Japan’s mapping of it own security interests onto the US’s ‘arc of 
instability’. The NDPG seeks to convert the JSDF from a force largely still structured 
to fight Cold War adversaries to become one that is ‘multifunctional, flexible and 
effective’ (Japan Defence Agency 2004). This is to be done by reducing the numbers 
of JSDF main battle tanks, frigates and interceptors, and placing emphasis instead on 
more mobile rapid-reaction GSDF units, on Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) 
amphibious and BMD systems, and on Air Self Defence Force (ASDF) long range 
transports—in short a new focus on power projection for ‘international peace 
cooperation’ including UN PKO and US-led multinational operations.  
 
Japan’s caution in the ‘war on terror’ 
Given this Japanese activity in the midst of the ‘war on terror’, and its impact in 
generating substantial change in Japan’s military posture, it is understandable that US 
policy-makers and other commentators might assume Japanese strategic convergence 
with the US based principally on the rationale of expunging terrorism. However, it is 
important to recognise that the strengthening of alliance ties is predicated on 
countering terrorism as only a semi-rationale, or even as a highly marginal rationale, 
from the Japanese perspective. 
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Japan-US divergent strategic objectives in the ‘war on terror’ 
Japanese policy-makers and public opinion expressed strong sympathy with the US in 
the wake of the 11 September attacks and for JSDF despatch under the ATSML to 
assist in dealing with the relatively clear cut threat of terrorism in Afghanistan. 
However, Japan’s support for the US-led invasion of Iraq appears to have been based 
on less of a sense of strategic convergence over the terrorist and WMD threat 
emanating from this state. Japanese policy-makers prior to the invasion in 2003 
certainly condemned Iraq’s perceived evasion of international inspections of its WMD 
programmes, and urged compliance with UN resolutions. Nevertheless, Japanese 
policy-makers also displayed in consultation amongst themselves considerable 
ambivalence about the final necessity of military action; the international legality and 
legitimacy of military action without clearer UN approval; the ability of the US to 
smash and then reconstruct the Iraqi state; and the risks of Japanese entrapment in US 
military strategy. However, in the final calculation, Japan’s lack of a strong strategic 
vision in common with the US in the case of Iraq was overridden by lingering 
concerns over WMD proliferation, and even more importantly the alliance imperative 
of being seen to show support for the US in order to enlist its support in countering 
the renewed nuclear threat from North Korea from 2002 onwards (Kamiya 2004, 14-
15).  
Japan in then enacting the IRL and announcing the Basic Plan for JSDF despatch 
sought to justify this action on the basis of alliance management. Prime Minister 
Koizumi began by stressing at the start of the announcement the need to assist the will 
of the international community (conflating this with essentially the two states of the 
US and the UK, and the weaker UN mandates of 1458 and 1511) in reconstructing 
Iraq. But Koizumi then moved to pack the second half of his statement with emphasis 
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upon the unique importance of the US for Japan’s own security and the need to 
maintain confidence in the bilateral alliance through the despatch of the JSDF to Iraq 
(Prime Minister of Japan Office 2003). 
Japan’s motivations in seeking to support the US can thus be seen to be only semi-
rationalised on the same basis as that of the US. Its principal alliance concern was to 
avoid any form of abandonment by the US in the case of dealing with security threats 
closer to home, rather than sharing the vision of the ‘war on terror’. In certain regards, 
it might be argued that Japan does in fact share similar characteristics with the UK as 
both states have plumped for a strategy of being seen to display close cooperation 
with the US in order to attempt to remain relevant and retain leverage over the 
unilateral behaviour of their key US ally. However, few would also doubt the 
commitment of large sections of the UK’s political leadership to the anti-terrorism 
and anti-WMD cause in Iraq, and Japan can also be seen to clearly differ from the UK 
in terms of how far it is willing to even consider extending the ‘war on terror’ and the 
military means by which to pursue it.  
Japan, for instance, has clearly not bought much of the logic of the ‘axis of evil’. It 
has been highly reluctant to line up with the US and its other allies over Iran. Japan’s 
concerns about energy security, and the need to secure oil resources in the Middle 
East, have meant that, even in the wake of 11 September and US condemnation of 
Iran’s nuclear programme, it has pushed ahead (albeit with great difficulty, and  
needing to cut the partly Japanese state-owned INPEX’s state in the field to 10 per 
cent from seventy five) with plans to retain a foothold in the development of Iran’s 
Azagedan oil field (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002). Moreover, even as international 
tensions with Iran have increased since mid-2006, Japan, whilst backing US-EU 
proposals to halt Iran’s nuclear programme, has continued to portray itself as a 
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mediator in the dispute. It has maintained close dialogue with Iran and resisted any 
form of active pressure such as financial sanctions.  
 
Divergence over methods in the ‘war on terror’ 
Japan’s divergence with the US becomes more apparent when it comes to the types of 
measures that it is prepared to utilise to address the questions of terrorism. Japan has 
been forthcoming in the despatch of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and to Iraq, and 
once again it is important to reiterate that these are potentially radical precedents for 
its exercise of military power in the future. But just as significant is the continued 
military operational hedging behaviour that Japan has displayed in limiting its 
involvement in conflicts.  
Japan has delimited its commitments in the Indian Ocean and Iraq by predicating 
the ATSML and Iraqi reconstruction law on extant UN resolutions, thus creating a 
potential escape route from future US requests for military cooperation that are 
deemed not to have sufficient UN legitimisation. These laws for JSDF despatch also 
set limited, although extendable, time limits on JSDF despatch so as to avoid open-
ended commitments to US-led operations.  
Japanese hedging is further demonstrated by the specific locations and missions for 
JSDF despatch. The JSDF are deployed purely in non-combat zones to limit the risks 
of embroilment in a conflict. The MSDF deployment to support the Afghan campaign 
in the Indian Ocean clearly removes Japanese exposure to the risks of ground war. 
The GSDF deployment in Iraq is far more hazardous, but Japan’s government did 
deploy to the relatively safest zone of Iraq it was possible to find, and its troops have 
relied on Dutch, Australian and UK forces for their security. JSDF forces have been 
deliberately limited in their capabilities so as to avoid any over-extension of their 
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commitment or ‘mission creep’. Japan’s government delayed despatching the 
MSDF’s Aegis destroyers to the Indian Ocean due to the fear that their interoperable 
systems would lead to US requests for them to be used as substitutes for US assets. 
Similarly, in Iraq the GSDF were provided with sufficient equipment to protect 
themselves, but not the type of weaponry that would mean they could become the 
object of US requests to assist active combat operations (Hughes 2004a: 131-133).  
The converse to Japan’s military hedging in its military deployments has been its 
emphasis instead—in line with its comprehensive security traditions—on a non-
military contribution to combating terrorism. Japan hosted in Tokyo the International 
Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan on 21-22 January 2002. At 
the conference Japan pledged up to US$500 million for rebuilding the government 
and physical infrastructure of the country, and the conference itself raised a total of 
US$4.5 billion. Similarly at the International Donors’ Conference on the 
Reconstruction of Iraq in Madrid in 2003, Japan pledged up to US$5 billion in grant 
and soft loan financial assistance, to be disbursed through the Iraqi government and 
international organisations. Japan’s economic-focussed approach to fighting terrorism 
is also demonstrated in its approach to the problem in East Asia. Japan’s government 
has viewed intra-state separatist conflict and terrorism in the Mindanao area of the 
Philippines as in part the outcome of the relative failure to date of that state’s 
developmental agenda, and the resultant severe economic disparities imposed on 
Mindanao. Consequently, the Japanese government in December 2002 unveiled a 
‘Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao’. It argued that strife in this 
Mindanao had, ‘aggravated the issue of poverty the area, creating a hotbed of 
terrorism’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2002, 2). Japan’s ODA package for 
Mindanao has aimed to break this cycle by improving the training of human resources 
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in the region, and by providing basic human needs such as medical care, rural 
development and infrastructure. Japan’s stance contrasts to some degree with that of 
the US which has looked to increasingly reengage militarily in the Philippines and 
Southeast Asia to counter radical Islamic insurgencies (Haacke 2003). 
Japan’s cautious resistance to the US’s global anti-terrorism military has been 
demonstrated again most recently by the DPRI in 2006. Japan’s government has 
certainly shifted part of the way to meet US demands—acceding to the use of its 
bases for US actions outside the scope of the Far East, signing on to increased 
command and control integration with the US, and emphasising common global 
strategic objectives in the SCC statement of February 2005. Nevertheless, even in the 
midst of these important changes in the bilateral alliance, Japan has shown the 
capacity to elude US requests in the future for active cooperation in anti-terrorism 
activities. It is striking that in the final intense phases of bilateral negotiations in late 
2005 and early 2006 Japan switched its emphasis almost solely to reducing the US 
base burden on Okinawa. The US was singularly unsuccessful in subsequent SCC 
meetings in October 2005 and May 2006 in extracting from Japan any further talk of 
common global strategic objectives, or specification of activities that it might 
undertake to combat terrorism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005b, 2006). This led US 
policy-makers to label the DPRI as more of a ‘real estate’ negotiation over bases, 
rather than a negotiation amongst allies with genuine new strategic objectives in a 
post-11 September world (Katō 2006).   
 
Exploiting the war on terror for regional security ends 
Japan can thus be seen to have only partially signed on to the ‘war on terror’ and to 
have exhibited limited strategic convergence with the US. But even though Japan may 
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have limited its military commitments in the ‘war on terror’, it is clearly not above 
utilising the threat of terrorism as a means to legitimise the driving forward of its 
security policy and alliance cooperation with the US in order to deal with more 
traditional threats to its own immediate security in its own region.  
Japan’s principal security concerns in the post-Cold War period, as explained in 
the introductory sections of this article, have been North Korea and China. These 
state-centred threats have continued to occupy a central position in Japanese security 
thinking even after 11 September, and most of the developments in Japan’s individual 
national capabilities and the US-Japan alliance have been geared to responding to 
them. Hence, even though Japan in its NDPG and MTDP is developing power 
projection capabilities that can serve for global as well as regional security, the 
primary focus for the usage of these still remains for the defence of its own immediate 
territory. The GSDF rapid-reaction force is to be co-located alongside the US I Army 
Corps at Camp Zama and will certainly become increasingly experienced in bilateral 
operations for global deployments, but its main function will still be to respond more 
quickly to the possibility of North Korean or even Chinese incursions into Japanese 
territory. Similarly, the MSDF’s new amphibious capabilities provide the potential for 
further deployments of the JSDF overseas in UN PKO and coalitions of the willing, 
but they also provide for improved defence of Japan’s outer islands. The MSDF’s 
BMD system is also a possible candidate for deployment beyond East Asia to provide 
defensive support for US operations, but its prime purpose still remains homeland 
defence in Japan and of US bases for dealing with regional contingencies. The ASDF 
is set to acquire new power projection capabilities as well, which can serve to support 
the US out-of-area, but the bulk of its interceptor force remains arrayed for defence 
against North Korea and most importantly Chinese incursions (Hughes 2005a).  
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Japan’s force structure is thus adding capacity for global operations and growing in 
experience of supporting the US in ‘coalitions of the willing’, but still the priority of 
Japanese defence planning remains focussed on immediate regional threats. This is 
not unsurprising perhaps, given Japan’s relatively unstable regional environment, 
China’s perceived military rise, and unsettled territorial disputes with its neighbours. 
Nevertheless, what is more surprising is the use of the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ 
and its accompanying changed strategic environment in order to justify a response to 
traditional security problems.  
Japan’s policy-makers and media have consistently labelled North Korea a ‘terror’ 
state, evidenced by its abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s and by 
the fushinsen incursions, and have use this as a justification for Japan to strengthen its 
coastal protection and MSDF capabilities (Hughes 1999; Leheny 2006, 157-164). 
North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities have also been conflated with these 
‘terrorist’ activities, and this has provided legitimisation for Japan to proceed with 
BMD to deal with what is essentially a traditional security issue that has been a 
concern since before the end of the Cold War. Japan’s revised NDPG also utilises the 
language of terror as a means to justify the response to essentially traditional threats 
from North Korea and China. The NDPG headlines Japan’s restructuring of its 
military by labelling this as a response to ‘new threats and diverse situations’ and 
gives prominence to the impact of September 11. But it then goes on to stress the 
sources of insecurity that Japan faces in the region originating from North Korea and 
China, and scenarios of ballistic missile attack, guerrilla incursions, and the 
occupation of its outer islands—state-centred threats, and hardly the stuff of trans-
national terrorism and the US and UK post-11 September agenda (Japan Defence 
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Agency 2004), but useful justification for military restructuring, especially when the 
mentioning of China as a threat is still largely a diplomatic taboo in Japan.  
 
Conclusion: Not Yet the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’ 
Japan is not yet the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’, as seen from its record in the ‘war 
on terror’. Those US policy-makers who have posited this as a role for Japan may in 
part have been setting an objective for Japan, rather than seeing this a finalised 
identity, but have clearly hoped that Japan would move in this direction. Japan, as 
argued elsewhere, is in many ways moving to become a more dependable and 
dependent US ally, and its activity in the ‘war on terror’ is a portent of this. But the 
key point to stress is that much of this alliance strengthening is being driven not by a 
strongly shared agenda on the objectives and means to respond to terrorism post-11 
September, but is being driven by Japan’s more parochial security concerns in the 
East Asia region relating to North Korea and China. Japanese policy-makers 
despatched the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and to Iraq to help their US ally combat 
terrorism, but they believed this was the price they had to pay in order to obtain the 
US’s assistance in facing down North Korea and most especially China over the 
longer term. Hence, the ‘war on terror’ has only been a semi-rationale at best for 
closer US-Japan alliance ties. The fundamental glue that holds the Japan-US alliance 
together remains regional East Asian threats. Consequently, the ‘war on terror’ has 
served more as a convenient rationale for camouflaging responses to traditional state-
based threats in East Asia.  
In this way, Japan has not followed the UK’s path in the ‘war on terror’. For sure, 
as pointed out above, there are similarities in intent by which Japan and the UK have 
both offered military support to the US in order to maintain close ties and hoped for 
 22
relevance to and leverage over the US. Moreover, both have shown an interest in 
departing from the US agenda and emphasising from the outset state-building as 
means to respond to terrorist phenomena. Furthermore, both Japan and the UK have 
clearly looked to avoid ultimate entrapment in US military strategy by attempting to 
hedge where possible. However, Japan’s degree of hedging, resistance to military 
commitments, and divergence in understanding of the centrality of terrorism in the 
contemporary security agenda, still differs greatly from the UK, with the result that is 
a far less forthcoming ally.  
The final conclusion that is thus drawn from the knowledge that Japan is not yet 
and is unlikely to be on a par with the US as an ally is that US policy-makers will 
need to tread warily in pushing allies in their commitments. The US has focussed on 
Japan as the fulcrum of its traditional and post-September security agenda in East 
Asia and has aspirations for the US-Japan alliance beyond this region. However, the 
US-Japan alliance, despite US prodding and hopes, is not yet fit for this purpose. This 
then calls into question much of the wider basis of current US defence planning and 
its role allocation to certain key allies.  
Acronyms 
ASDF  Air Self Defence Force 
ATSML Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law  
BMD  Ballistic Missile Defence 
DPRI  Defence Policy Review Initiative 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
GPR  Global Posture Review 
GSDF  Ground Self Defence Force 
IPCL  International Peace Cooperation Law 
IRL  Iraqi Reconstruction Law 
JDA  Japan Defence Agency  
JSDF  Japan Self Defence Forces 
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party  
MOFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MSDF  Maritime Self Defence Force 
MTDP  Mid-Term Defence Programme 
NDPG  National Defence Programme Guideline 
PSI  Proliferation Security Initiative 
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SCC  Security Consultative Committee 
WMD  Weapon of Mass Destruction 
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